1990s or remains tied to this period, the decade itself appears to receive an almost universal condemnation. Furthermore, this condemnation does not merely single out particular features of this period as an object of negation, but rather negates the 1990s in their entirety, negates this period as a time of pure negativity. In a previous study we have discussed this disavowal in terms of the dialectic of politicisation and depoliticisation that inevitably accompanies the revolutionary moment, of which the demise of Soviet socialism is certainly a prime example. In this article, we shall focus in more detail on the specifically temporal aspects of the period of the 1990s and the contemporary period that remains tied to the 1990s by a complex ritual of disavowals and recuperations. We shall argue that the perception of the 1990s as a 'negative time' is correct ontologically, if not normatively, insofar as this period has been marked by a paradoxical temporality that is best grasped with the help of Giorgio Agamben's understanding of 'messianic time' and his idiosyncratic reading of the 'end of history'. Similarly, we shall propose that the Putin period does not break with this 'post-historical' temporality in spite of its diametrically opposite relation to its post-revolutionary nature. These reflections on the specific temporality of 'our time' serve as prolegomena for the much more extensive project of rethinking Russian postcommunist politics with a view to establishing modes of political practice proper to the strange present which we inhabit -a project whose time has long arrived, but whose temporality is entirely alien to the linear-progressivist and circular-conservative narratives that preclude from the outset any possibility of understanding the Russian politics of our time.
TIMELESSNESS WITHOUT END: HOW THINGS TAKE PLACE WITHOUT SIGNIFICANCE
In the contemporary Russian discourse on the 1990s, this period is regularly characterised in terms of 'timelessness' (bezvremenie), a veritable black hole in between the crisis of the Soviet order and the reassertion of the Russian 'liberal bureaucratic' state under President Putin. However facile, these readings are not entirely without credence, since it is possible to establish a historical connection between the Putin period and the crisis-ridden period of the later Perestroika.
Ironically, however unpredictable Putin's rise to power was in 1999, it was perfectly anticipated in the late 1980s, when the media discourse on the immediate future of Soviet politics was dominated with hyperbolic fears and hopes for 'black colonels', who would restore order, drop the degenerate Marxist-Leninist ideology and introduce a 'modern' economic system with an 'iron fist'. This 'authoritarian modernisation' scenario is precisely what happened in Russia in the late 1990s, although in that context it was a lot less likely, in comparison with such alternative scenarios as the revanche of the Communist party or the triumph of far-right populism of either Vladimir Zhirinovsky or Alexander Lebed. One can therefore link up Gorbachev and Putin eras in a straight historical narrative, beginning with failed attempts to reform the system from within and ending with a moderately successful restoration of order and welfare under a modernising autocracy. In a retroactive projection, Russia could have simply moved from Gorbachev to Putin, bypassing the 1990s. This is what is suggested in many semi-official narratives, for which the Yeltsin period is indeed reduced to a 'nightmare', which is of course a period of time that is, as it were, taken out of the 'normal temporality' of existence, even if it leaves its lurid stain on it at the moment of awakening.
Should we then drop the 1990s as a mere disappointing deviation, a period of meaningless lingering in political instability and a chronic crisis, a 'waste of time'? In fact, it is precisely the strange temporality of the 1990s that permits to reassess this period in the light of contemporary tendencies in the Putin presidency. Such a reassessment has nothing to do with endorsing particular tendencies and policies of that period as somehow more 'progressive', 'liberal' or 'democratic' than the present course of development. While the half-hearted valorisation of the 1990s as an era of 'reforms' in some circles of the 'liberal' anti-Putin opposition appears to us to be entirely implausible, there remains something intangibly attractive in this period that could be the object of a Foucauldian gesture of 'nonpositive affirmation', possibly the only possible form of affirmation available to us in the present condition of global post-political scepticism and a self-righteous cynicism that permeates the entire political spectrum in Russia.
The 1990s are indeed a time like no other. In the present context of political consolidation and economic growth this period is used as a derogatory metaphor for two at first glance incompatible modes of temporality. For some, the 1990s are the moment of ceaseless political activity, endless change and constant crisis, a period when time, as it were, accelerated itself to the point of unbearably rapid transformation, so that the present political stabilisation is a 'healthy' symptom of a return to normality after a bad dream. For others, the 1990s are a period of 'timelessness' (bezvremenie), when nothing really happened or all that happened was in vain. For instance, political struggle between the Yeltsin presidency and its opposition in the Congress of People's Deputies during 1991-1993 or the Communist-dominated Duma during 1995-1999 was manifestly a zero-sum (if not a negative-sum) game, which weakened both parties and entailed that every victory was, in a sense, a return to 'square one', a replay of the foundational moment of the end of the Soviet order. All political struggles of this period were paradoxically inconclusive, victory (which was usually Yeltsin's) being frequently indistinguishable from defeat, as the old antagonism was immediately reinscribed in a new form. In this sense, the landmark events of the politics of the 1990s (the dissolution of the Congress of People's Deputies in 1993, Yeltsin's reelection in 1996, Yevgeny Primakov's assent to and descent from power in 1998-1999) were manifest non-events, as all that was revealed in them was simply the perpetuation of the existing structure in an unstable and illegitimate mode. Perhaps, these diametrically opposed diagnoses should be read together: during the 1990s too much actually took place, but with no effect. The diagnosis of timelessness then refers not to the temporality but to the finality of the event. The 1990s were a period of momentous change without end in both senses of the word: the change lacked all purpose precisely in its being ceaseless and was ceaseless by virtue of the absence of any purpose.
It is not surprising that this period was marked by a strange and discomforting temporality. In the Russian experience, the 1990s stand for the revolutionary moment of foundation and this period is therefore by definition 'a time out of joint', an uncomfortable time out of time, a time of timelessness that can only retroactively be posited as the 'dawn' of a new temporality or be otherwise recuperated in a regular chronology. As a momentary spark of violent revolt that dispenses with the old order and inaugurates a new one, revolutionary time is always, as it were, taken out of the 'normal' chronological context or 'borrowed' from it. The failure of revolution restores this 'borrowed time' to the old regime in the form of a pure negation of the revolution as a 'time of troubles' or a 'putsch'. On the other hand, the success of the revolution inaugurates a new temporality, whereby the time, borrowed from the temporality of the old regime itself becomes the source of value, functioning as the foundational moment of the new order. In no case, however, does revolutionary time re-enter the temporal economy without being radically transformed. The difference of the Russian experience from this logic of the 'extra-temporal' revolutionary spark simply consists in the fact that this moment lasted far longer than one might expect, i.e. for the most part of the decade of the 1990s, and, as we shall argue below, might still be with us today.
In a previous book we have defined this period in terms of the lingering of the political, a paradoxical perpetuation of the foundational moment of postcommunism for almost a decade, when the revolutionary origin of the new regime remained visible, which hampered any efforts to depoliticise the new regime by reinscribing founding acts in terms of stable foundations. 2 Empirically, this failure to depoliticise owed to the political weakness of the presidency, which remained embattled by the oppositional legislature, separatist tendencies in the regions and the assault on the political autonomy of the state by the oligarchic clans of business elites. 3 The overall effect of the lingering of the political was precisely this perception of ceaseless and meaningless activity of change without end, of a revolution that reflexively turned to revolutionising itself, increasingly creating the impression that the Yeltsin regime was literally living 'on borrowed time'.
At the same time, this lingering state of political rupture was never a mere 'waste of time' in the sense of the absence of political content. We should rather say that the 1990s were oversaturated in terms of content and it is precisely this oversaturation that in our view provides a clue to the strange temporality of the 1990s. Against all accusatory attributions to Yeltsin of an autocratic style, we must assert that Yeltsin's rationality of rule was in a strict sense anti-hegemonic at the same time as it was sovereign in Carl Schmitt's sense. Recalling the decade of Yeltsin's rule we can't help noticing that Yeltsin's leadership in 'normal' political periods was close to disastrous, being marked by incessant court intrigues, the high influence of informal or 'shadow' interests and a generally poor state of administration. At the same time, Yeltsin was incomparably successful as a leader in times of crisis, which is perhaps less surprising given that the crises in question were of his own making. In full accordance with Schmitt's dictum, Yeltsin only decided on the exception, leaving the capacity of everyday administration of the state to the competing interest groups in and out of the government. Starting from Yeltsin's masterful seizure of power in the aftermath of the failed coup of August 1991 to the equally brilliant transfer of power to Putin as a designated successor on the Eve of the Millennium, we observe a series of interventions that frequently came at the last moment, when it was thought that the opposition was firmly on its way to power. Failing miserably in establishing a meaningful sociopolitical order of his own, Yeltsin nonetheless also succeeded in preventing all other political forces from doing this, so that the political history of the 1990s may be viewed as a series of 'averted catastrophes' or 'lost opportunities', depending on one's political orientation. What Yeltsin's sovereignty guarded was not any positive order but the very possibility of trying out various courses of political development that, however, could always be played back, suspended or reversed with no consequence for the country. If politics resembled a theatre in the 1990s, it is because it was indeed a spectacle, in which political struggle took place intensely but somehow not seriously, as something that can always be suspended by an intermission or simply finished when the time of performance runs out. 4 Risking a psychological explanation, we might venture that this political style might well be an idiosyncrasy of a revolutionary that Yeltsin clearly was: having succeeded in the struggle against Soviet communism, which even the most radical 4 Cf. Mikhail Remizov, "Apologia Vlasti: Razmyshlenia po Sledam Spectaklya". NG-Stsenarii, no. 8 (53) (2000) . The reader might consider it questionable to speak of the 'unserious' nature of such events as the suppression of the nationalist-communist uprising in October 1993. At the same time, the fact that all the participants of this 'mutiny' were amnestied weeks after the event of the uprising and some have subsequently pursued rather lucrative political careers in the new regime points to a certain reversibility of this event. The sad fact that most of the victims of these events were non-participating bystanders also points to the fact that the costs of the political spectacle were largely borne by its audience rather than by its participants. dissidents comfortably viewed as requiring years if not decades, he remained too stunned by his own victory to attempt the construction of a new system. Instead, Yeltsin's decade of rule may be viewed as a certain mesmerized fixation on the ruins of the Soviet order that from the outset disabled any productive activity. Having dared and succeeded in destroying a system with claims to world-historical significance, Yeltsin could only be expected to perceive any construction of a new system to be a project that was doomed from the outset. However, this sense of futility was not Yeltsin's alone: the radical nationalist and Communist opposition to Yeltsin throughout the 1990s was remarkably half-hearted (as was its support by the society), carrying a romantic air of a 'lost cause' even before its cause was properly articulated. 5 The enormity of the collapse of the Soviet order was such that it could well be perceived as the 'end of time', which indeed calls for a certain suspension of action because everything has already happened. In this sense, the temporality of the lingering moment of the political is clearly of the order of messianic suspension as described by Giorgio Agamben. 6 5 The writings of Alexander Prokhanov, a novelist and a founding editor of the national-Communist weekly Zavtra that has been the primary forum of radical opposition, are particularly illustrative of this tendency. (Derrida, Badiou, Taubes, etc.) , the concept of the messianic is divorced both from the concrete figure of the messiah and from the theological tradition in general. This 'messianism without messianism' only seeks to retain in the messianic tradition the experience of a pure event that ruptures the existing order of being, radically reshaping one's conditions of existence. In this sense, the concept of the messianic functions as a metaphor that condenses a number of problematics that have long preoccupied continental philosophy, from the concept of the event to the experience of radical alterity. In this 'messianic constellation', we may distinguish between the Derridean approach, which conceives of the messianic as 'to-come', present in the present only in the modality of a promise or injunction, and Agamben's more strictly speaking post-messianic approach, in which the messianic moment has already arrived or, more precisely, there is no need to wait for its arrival since it is fully available to us in our present existence. While Derrida's 'weak messianism' does not seek to dispense with the existing structures of order but rather to highlight the undecidability and the presence of the messianic promise within them, Agamben's 'strong messianism' seeks to dispense with the existing structure of the political as such in a self-consciously apocalyptic prophecy of a profane 'happy life' beyond the reach of the law. All things could unfold in the timelessness of the 1990s, but precisely because this time is out of normal, 'chronological' or historical time, their unfolding is entirely inconsequential. This is the end of history in the sense of the messianic suspension of all teleology, whereby the sacrifices of the past and the dreams of the future are all equally redeemed in the timeless now. The difference between Agamben's messianic concept of the end of history and the more familiar, liberaluniversalist reading by Fukuyama is evident: what is at stake for Agamben is not the triumph of one progressive teleology but the destruction of the teleological dimension as such. In a sense, the 1990s were the time of the many ends of history, the simultaneous expiry of all teleological metanarratives that ultimately displaced the very teleological terrain, in which they could compete. With the end of the Soviet order history ended not because of the unrivalled supremacy of Western liberalism (that itself could only be established by a facile subtraction of the Soviet Union from the bipolar system) but rather because the pitiful demise of the Soviet order made the very idea of rivalry between grand teleological metanarratives inconceivable. The end of the Soviet Union, which has famously failed to be predicted by analysts inside and outside the country, marked a violent entry of pure contingency into politics, after which 'history' as a field of contestation between rival images of the future lost the very condition of its possibility.
Insofar as such contestation did take place in the Russia of the 1990s, it was tainted from the outset by the perception of this impossibility to master history, which renders all 'substantive', future-oriented politics suspect not only due to its insensitivity to contingency (a point raised repeatedly in the Western critical discourse with regard to any value-based politics as potentially 'totalitarian') but also due to the meaninglessness of the very discourse on historical progress amid the ruins of Soviet socialism. This permits to understand why the frequently discussed depoliticisation of the Russian society took place almost immediately after the anticommunist revolution in August 1991. 8 Rather than a betrayal of the anticommunist revolution, this retreat into private life was rather its logical conclusion. The exodus of the society from the space of value-based political antagonism left Russian politics to its own devices, so that it increasingly resembled a spectacle with an ever-diminishing audience. 9 The anti-communist revolution was manifestly not democratic, let alone liberal, but rather perfectly nihilist in sense given to the term by both Benjamin and Agamben. 10 Rather than attempt to depose a discredited order and replace it with a positive alternative (liberalism, nationalism, etc.), the anticommunist revolution suspended the very possibility of the construction of a new order, instituting instead a paradoxical, permanently unstable regime, whose authority was only sufficient to ensure that nothing ever takes the vacant place of the Soviet order. All things could happen (the revolution was, after all, about freedom), but they should not matter to the society in the sense of once again transforming its conditions of existence or putting this existence at stake in yet another 'progressive project'.
The societal depoliticisation in the 1990s might therefore be viewed as itself a form of politics, i.e. a politics of fundamental passivity in Agamben's sense. According to Stefano Franchi, Agamben's concept of passivity must not be read in terms of pure inactivity, but rather as a ceaseless activity that is however deprived of any telos, whereby all sorts of things happen for no reason whatsoever. This is of course the only politics proper to the suspension of teleology in the end of Historical beings act in order to brings about certain ends; in the political realm, they act in order to transform the ideal ends provided by the metaphysical description of man into actuality by transforming or empirically negating the given reality. Posthistorical beings, being the rascals they truly are, just act with no particular end in sight.
Their life is pure self-contained action that does not receive its meaning from a transcendent telos, but becomes, paradoxically, meaningful in its being meaningless.
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In the absence of a transcendent telos, 'post-historical' existence becomes its own only value, which is summed up in the key concept of Agamben's ontology, 'being-such' or 'whatever being', i.e. "life for which living itself would be at stake in its own living". The affirmation of 'beingsuch' by the society which exited the condition of Soviet socialism is furthest away from the mantras of 'transition to democracy' that passed for political analysis for the most part of the 1990s. Indeed, if there is any substance at all in this politics of whatever being, it is the refusal of any idea of 'transition', of any demand of the population to submit its existence to any political project ever again.
The "happy life" on which political philosophy should be founded thus cannot be either the naked life that sovereignty posits as a presupposition so as to turn it into its own subject or the impenetrable extraneity of science and of modern biopolitics that everybody tries in vain to sacralize. This "happy life" should be rather, an absolutely profane "sufficient life" that has reached the perfection of its own power and its own communicability-a life over which sovereignty and right no longer have any hold. 12 In the manner of Melville's Bartleby, a figure that probably embodies Agamben's entire philosophy, the Russian society 'would prefer not to' engage in any transition, transformation or reform and only engages in politics to defend its 'being-such-as-it-is'.
13 The societal exit from the political space in the course of anticommunist revolution may thus be said to perform a 'messianic shift that integrally changes the world, leaving it almost intact' 14 -nothing much really took place in 1991, in comparison with the other great revolutions of modernity, but nonetheless after this event everything has changed, even if and especially when it appeared to stay the same.
Artemiy Magun is thus entirely correct in his claim that the 'minimal' character of the anticommunist revolution is not an indicator of its deficiency, but rather the proof that this revolution was a genuine event, a purely formal act of negation, after which nothing stays the same even if it does not undergo any substantive change.
15 What the messianic shift of the 1990s has left us with is a sense of the profound impossibility of any teleological politics due to the societal refusal to lend its present-being-such for any work towards the future. In other words, the postcommunist society has refused the appropriation of temporality by state power, whereby the society would surrender its living in the pure present and be left with an indeterminate and worthless 'bright future'. By virtue of this single gesture, both the progress of the liberal-democratic transition and any kind of restoration and revanche have become impossible.
13 See Prozorov, "Infra-Liberalism" for a more detailed empirical discussion of this situation. The singular value of Agamben's conception of passive politics is that it permits to approach without facile condemnations, quasi-cultural totalisations and dubious definitions-by-negation, the phenomenon of societal depoliticisation that is given a mention in practically every study of Russian politics since the early 1990s but never, to our knowledge, approached in its positivity, but always viewed as a (more or, usually, less tolerable) lack, deficiency or an indicator of deviance or pathology. Such an a priori negative construction of the object of analysis is problematic not only because it permits the analyst to speak in the enunciative modality of a doctor, offering to cure this societal pathology, but also because from the methodological standpoint this stance 'doctors' the empirical evidence, describing what-is in terms of whatit-is-not. The benefit of an Agambenian reading of the societal retreat from politics is therefore not whether it is more or less 'applicable' or 'correct' with respect to Russian postcommunism, but that it offers a mode of description, in which this phenomenon can be rendered in its positivity. The same goes for the more general argument of the 'post-historical' and 'post-messianic' character of Russian postcommunism. It is evident that we are not making an empirical claim that 'Russian history has ended' or that 'history has ended in Russia', which would be logically impossible precisely as an empirical claim, since it would be impossible to refute it. The end of history does not function as an empirical observation, nor is it any form of a regulative idea or, by definition, a utopian promise.
It is rather an ethos, in the form of a way of life or a relation to the self, that is situated entirely in the present and acquires its specificity precisely from this 'being entirely in the present'.
In the remainder of this article we shall probe the question of how this paradoxical politics of the 1990s has fared in the Putin period, whose official discourse has posited the task of the overcoming of the 1990s.
THE SUSPENSION OF THE MESSIANIC: WHY RUSSIA NO LONGER CELEBRATES NOVEMBER 7
Putinism is normally viewed by both its adherents and its critics as a period of time after the end of time, a return to normality after a traumatic rupture of Yeltsinism that lingered for an entire decade. However, why was Yeltsin's 'sovereign anarchism' succeeded precisely by Putin's liberalbureaucratic authoritarianism with (as we shall argue below) its highly specific vision of normality? We may suggest that it was because this mode of depoliticisation is paradoxically closest The increase of the momentum and efficiency of the reform process in the absence of political confrontation has been described as the main achievement of the Putin presidency and a sign of political consolidation and stabilisation in postcommunist Russia. The relative success of this consolidation is well illustrated by the bitterness with which it is addressed by Putin's opponents from the 'left-conservative' camp 20 :
The decade of reforms was sufficient to come to terms with 'being-thrown-into-themarket' as something inevitable. Two years of Putin's 'rule' were sufficient to spontaneously legitimate the post-Soviet structural degradation of society […] as a constituted and adequate reality. This is the necessary precondition of the conservative politico-17 As a side comment, let us recall that the temporality of the carnival was described in Bakhtin's classic study of Rabelais as, in a sense, 'taken out' from the course of ordinary chronological time. 18 The latter expression was used by Putin to describe his 'occupation' during his televised participation in the census poll in October 2002.
See e.g. http://www.izvestia.ru/community/article24971. psychological complex: the ability to perceive one's social environment not in terms of collapse, catastrophe or a chaotic 'transitional moment' but as a crystallised reality, with regard to which it is possible to talk about 'conservation', 'reproduction' and 'transformation '. 21 At the same time, it appears difficult to reconcile this impressive degree of stabilisation and consolidation with Putin's tautological politics of efficiency, which evades any determinate answer to the question of for what the society must be stabilised or consolidated. Early in the Putin presidency, this dissonance resulted in the increasing recourse to phantasmatic discourses that claim to find behind the façade of sterile technocracy something like a 'real Putin' with a substantive political project that was, depending on the taste of the observer, either extremely liberal or extremely authoritarian -but always extreme, as if the only way to compensate for the surface nihilism of Putinite politics was to imagine its 'real' content to be so extreme as to somehow deserve being hidden. As Mikhail Remizov, a conservative political philosopher, has amply demonstrated, these discourses have been little more than self-serving illusions, since a hidden or latent political project is a contradiction in terms, the political being necessarily phenomenal rather than noumenal and hence contained without remainder in the actually occurring discursive practices. "'Putin's soul' is a metaphysical prejudice.
[…] We simply need to recognise that there is nothing beneath the apparent, even if the apparent hints towards the existence of a secret.
Secretiveness is the last resort of power, which no longer has anything about it that could deserve being hidden. Thus, Putin 'wants' precisely that which he talks about, i.e. nothing." 22 The fact that there is a perception of the existence of 'another Putin' behind the surface of technocratic nihilism is merely a blunt proof of the fact that that the actual Putin project 'comes down to nothing'. Putin is thus interpreted in the oppositional circles as merely the sign of the routinisation of the nihilism of the 1990s, its most logical conclusion: if Putin is a patriot, his 'patria' is the 'New Russia' of decadent hedonism that the oppositional observers consider an Consequently, if for Yeltsin all politics could play out in the condensed messianic time with no serious finality because everything significant has already happened, for Putin nothing serious should happen because it already happened once and it is the terror of this event (which Putin personally witnessed not in Russia but in the GDR) that animates every aspect of Putin's politics.
For Yeltsin, the void of the political functioned as a transcendent opening, in which all past and future politics may be accomplished in a state of a messianic suspension of teleology that drops all demands on human existence. In contrast, for Putin this void is a mere gap in the immanent fabric of the new order, the condition for its non-identity with itself, which must be filled in by the sovereign to effect the closure of the system unto self-immanence. However, by filling in this locus in a posture of ideological neutrality and technocratic tautology, Putin reduces his own sovereignty to a purely formal marker that conceals the constitutive vacuity of the social order.
The very name 'Putin' is an empty signifier that weaves together a set of meaningless tautologies into what today passes for 'Russian politics', a politics of efficient stability or stable efficiency. Putin's regime effaces the messianic dimension of the revolutionary moment and affirms as the new object of celebration the exit from the revolutionary condition, choosing as the new holiday the date that is only two days away from the familiar day-off on November 7. In contrast,
Yeltsin's renaming of the holiday as a Day of Consent and Reconciliation in 1992 sought to dispense entirely with the substance of Soviet socialism by focusing the 'celebration' on the rehabilitation of anti-Soviet resistance from the White Army to Soviet-era dissidents, but, in a gesture of singular significance, retained the date of November 7. While the reasoning behind this decision may have manifold motives, we may interpret it as an indicator of Yeltsin's unwitting fidelity to the pure event of the revolution, which, irrespectively of his opposition to its ensuing positive content, did not allow him to entirely efface the revolutionary moment.
In a perfect contrast with Putinism, during the 1990s the October Revolution remained valorised as a purely formal event, its formality well illustrated by its reduction to a mere calendar date.
Utterly intolerant of the political content of the Revolution, Yeltsin nonetheless remained faithful to its event. While the Putin presidency is ready and willing to affirm select aspects of the Soviet order but must disavow its revolutionary origin, Yeltsin could paradoxically affirm the revolution as a pure event which, when deprived of all its substance, is formally identical to the anticommunist revolution of 1991. 26 From this perspective, it would not be surprising if any future opposition to the Putin regime began to use 'November 7' as its constitutive signifier in the absence of any concern for establishing one's relation to the period of Soviet communism. In the present constellation, the October Revolution has been stripped of almost any substantive content and figures in the discourse solely as a marker for the possibility of an event (much as the French Revolution in the West European discourse, wherein its symbolic significance has long had little to do with its practically forgotten content). The sole significance of November 7 today consists in its function as an indicator of the fundamental political possibility that disrupts all temporal necessity, all teleological attribution of purpose to time and inaugurates a messianic time of the pure event.
If November 7 appears to be a potential marker of resistance to Putinism from a variety of ideological standpoints, it is because the central motif of the Putin presidency is the fear of revolution as such. It is from this perspective that we may understand the irrational and politically disadvantageous stand of the President on the 'colour revolutions' in the post-Soviet space, marked by a brazen support for the discredited and corrupt incumbent elites that were hardly ever 'pro-Russian'. Rather than point to cynical cost-benefit calculations or the unconscious persistence of the Soviet 'imperialist' disposition, Putin's negative stance on the 'revolutions' in the Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan rather reveals an apprehension before any political rupture, however simulative and ultimately 'uneventful', as has arguably been the case in all three 'revolutions'. The presidency is apprehensive of any interruption of the technocratic temporality of the 'eternal present' by what from the perspective of the suspension of the messianic could only be conceived as a 'time of troubles'.
It is in this 'fear of the event' that the Putin presidency has been particularly disappointing for many of its supporters. As a number of conservative commentators formerly positively disposed towards Putin have noted, Putin's own advent was perceived by many to be a genuine Event, a farewell to the timelessness of the 1990s, after which history could begin again. However, ironically, the 'event' of Putinism has been entirely exhausted by its own advent, since the entire period of the Putin presidency has been marked by the evasion of political identification and the 26 From this perspective, the accusatory label 'neo-Bolsheviks', applied by the opposition to the liberal reformers of the early 1990s, including Yeltsin, may be appreciated as fully valid as a designation of the revolutionary political form, notwithstanding all the differences in substantive political content.
bureaucratic suppression of all those who happen to have such an identification, from the radical left to pro-Western liberals. Putin's invariably high approval rating may well be due to precisely this evasion of the political, i.e. Putin is tolerable because, and as long as, he does not do anything to disturb the societal 'being-such'. As we have argued above, the anticommunist revolution of 1991 was marked by a fundamental estrangement of the society from the political domain, a certain abandonment of power to its own devices, whereby it can revel in the majesty of its sovereignty on the condition that it does not exercise it. In their distinct ways, both the Yeltsin and the Putin presidencies fulfilled this condition. During the 1990s Russian politics was a spectacle of hegemonies and counter-hegemonies, reforms and counter-reforms, rises and falls, all of which were a priori thwarted in their ability to achieve any finality and therefore became of increasingly little interest even to their participants, not to speak of the population at large. In the Putin period, this spectacle gave way to an austere hegemony of nihilistic technocracy, which a priori forecloses the possibility of a political event.
While for Yeltsin all things could happen and be reversible in the messianic condensation of temporality, in Putin's times nothing major can or must happen due to the suspension of the very possibility of the event. In the 1990s all things took place without serious consequences, while nowadays nothing is allowed to really happen at all and stability is elevated to the status of the overriding political value. Against all the attributions of reformist credentials to the current administration, we may rather suggest that its legitimacy and support are rather grounded in a fundamental societal prohibition to intervene in its existence, to disturb the immanence of postcommunist 'profane life' outside the political order. Perhaps someday this will be known as the 'Russian idea' -a certain 'impotentialisation' of power through a paradoxical synthesis of the acceptance of the majesty of sovereignty and the prohibition on its exercise. 27 This prohibition that in our view forms the 'unthought' and definitely 'unspeakable' foundation of Putinism has a direct relation to the end of history. In Agamben's argument, a truly post-messianic life is a life that is 'irreparable' or 'unsavable', not because repair or salvation is impossible, but because there is no longer anything to save or repair. In Putin's politics of immanent vacuity, there is indeed nothing that, strictly speaking, calls for saving or repairing, hence no fundamental change is any What is at stake in the irreparable nature of the post-messianic present is the realisation that whatever future we might have is entirely present in the present in which we live.
HAPPILY EVERAFTER: HOW TO FORGET THE FUTURE
What are we to make of this understanding of the temporality of Russian postcommunism?
Although it can easily be dismissed as philosophically abstruse and entirely unrelated to the actuality of contemporary politics, it is advisable to pause and take one's time prior to such dismissal of the problem of temporality. It would certainly be wrong to suggest that this question In a more philosophical sense, the 1990s and, as we have argued also the present moment in Russian politics exemplifies in a concrete manner the type of politics we associate with most radical political philosophy of our times, particularly Giorgio Agamben's work on the coming community of worklessness, the politics of pure means and the messianic 'happy life' after the end of history. As all 'first philosophy', Agamben's ontological thought is notoriously difficult to 'apply' in empirical studies -a problem that is made all the more difficult by the eschatological and even apocalyptic tone of his writings. At the same time, the experience of Russian postcommunism accords strongly with Agamben's 'prelude to a coming politics', particularly insofar as the former entirely fulfils Agamben's condition of possibility of the latter -the destruction of state sovereignty, which in our case is fulfilled in the demise of the Soviet state and the failure to constitute the post-Soviet Russian state as a sovereign state. 29 The 1990s as a moment of the messianic suspension stand for the politics utterly deprived of all telos, a politics of means without meaning, since everything has already taken place, so that there is no need any more for grand historical projects of transformation. Indeed, the very concept of postcommunist transformation that we continue to rely upon is misleading -the entire point of the postcommunist period (as opposed to the momentary spark of anticommunist revolution in 1991) is that nothing at all is transformed in it and the very idea of transformation appears discredited on the societal level, abandoned for a purely immanent, inoperative existence. Putin's politics is particularly exemplary of this dismantling of teleology -as a number of analysts of radically different persuasions have noted, it appears that the only objective of the Putin presidency is, literally, to hold out through the two presidential terms and ensure the election of a successor whose only purpose will similarly be a mere holding out. From the transitionalist perspective and the more commonsensical understanding of political temporality in terms of 'progress' and 'development', the diagnosis of postcommunism as a period of messianic and counter-messianic suspension, the condensation of reversible futures in either 'change without end' or the 'end of all change' might appear to be empirically counterintuitive and normatively problematic, since it can only mean a farewell to 'progressive politics' as we know it. At the same time, why should the cessation of the progressive temporality of political history be viewed as a necessarily pessimistic scenario? To recall Agamben, the end of history understood as the suspension of teleology ushers in a time without meaning, divorcing human existence from the imperative of work and letting it be in the form of potentiality understood in terms of radical passivity. However apocalyptic and arcane this vision appears, Agamben notes that in the post-messianic time 'everything will be as it is now, just a little different'. 30 Rather than think the messianic in terms of a momentous transformation, Agamben suggests that its 'little difference' from teleological politics concerns the relation of human beings to their own existence rather than the introduction of some new content to this existence. The end of history drops all demands on the human being, disqualifying from the outset all values that up to the present have served as imperatives for sacrifice of the self and of others.
Agamben's quasi-eschatological vision of a politics of life-as-such (also described as a politics of potentiality, a profane politics, a politics of 'whatever singularity' or a politics of absolute immanence) conjures a possibility of human existence in which nothing else is any longer at stake, in which the purpose of existence is entirely contained in its sheer factuality. From this perspective, there indeed is no purpose or possibility in progress or development, as the present can no longer be incorporated into a teleological vision of the future, for which we must sacrifice ourselves in the here and now. Neither is it possible to cast the present as a time of redemption of the past promises or the rectification of past errors. The end of history entails that time is no longer conceivable in the form of a project for the human being but is rather a condition of his existence. History ends when there is no longer an attempt to master time. In other words, the messianic end of history is the very opposite of the teleological 'end of history', prophesied by Fukuyama: the former appears only as the proof of the impossibility of the latter. History ends not when it arrives at a certain teleological end-state but when it becomes evident that it does not have such an end-state. In this sense, a messianic end of history is a double end, both an expiry of history in terms of its teleology and an expiry of the very teleology that made it meaningful to talk about the end of history in the first place. At stake is not merely the loss of a future open to competing teleologies and projects of transformation but the loss of that very loss itself, a certain forgetting of the future. 31 All that remains after the end of history is the present, the now in which we live and which is the only time in which it might finally be possible to live, once existence is released from its deployment as a project into an 'ease' of pure potentiality. 32
For Agamben, the messianic dimension of potentiality is the dimension of freedom, which is only possible insofar as the human being has liberated himself from the 'work' of history, from the possession of or by an identity, from the capture or abandonment by sovereign authority. The messianic temporality provides a possibility if not an injunction to live as if order, identity and meaning did not exist, to live in exile or dispossession from all that seizes life and turns it into a work. In the messianic time one may live in the world and use it without possessing it, which would be equivalent to being possessed by it. The messianic logic of 'as-if-not', which we have demonstrated to be operative in the 1990s' condensation of political temporality, when all things could happen as if they didn't, also relates more generally to social life, which in the postcommunist period arguably unfolded as if politics and the state did not exist. Against conventional readings, which posit the requirement of meaning, identity and authority as fundamental to human existence, we might rather suggest that after the end of history the 31 Cf. Agamben, The Coming Community, 102: "Redemption is not an event in which what was profane becomes sacred and what was lost is found again. Redemption is, on the contrary, the irreparable loss of the lost, the definitive profanity of the profane. But, precisely for this reason, they now reach their end -the advent of a limit." possibilities of life are rather conditioned by the renunciation of authority, identity and historical direction. In this case, the late-and post-Soviet experience of Russia may be offered as a concrete example of Agamben's messianic politics of the future, a politics of profanity, worklessness and imperfection. Whether this politics merits the name of 'happy life' that Agamben, following
Benjamin, endows it with, is an entirely different question. However, to pose this very question it has been necessary to take the time to problematise postcommunist temporality in terms of the messianic 'end of history' and clear this space from the teleologies of transition and the circularities of 'the return'. In contrast to transitionalist and traditionalist accounts that lay a claim to knowing the future, which nonetheless never arrives, the Agambenian perspective mercilessly insists that today's ateleological and irreparable present is all there is and all we have. Happiness knows no delay or deferral. Against all future-oriented politics, which makes a promise of 'happy life' and thereby reduces 'actual life' into a project, we must assert that 'happy life' can only be sought and achieved in the profane present, that happiness can no longer wait.
